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Abstract The increasing demand for biomass for energy
use is further escalating existing food security risks.
Managing these risks is a task for global institutions. These
should ensure timely investment in the world’s capacity for
producing biomass and balance the use of this biomass for
foods and for non-foods. To achieve this, institutional
arrangements for global food markets must fulfil two
important goals: reduce the short-term price instability of
food markets and prevent a structural scarcity of food in the
long term. This paper analyses how agro-food markets,
energy markets and biofuel markets are currently regulated.
As this regulation is ill-suited to manage food price
instabilities and balance food and non-food use of biomass,
new institutions need to be put in place. A coordinated
system of global commodity management — not unlike the
Commodity Control Organization proposed by Keynes for
the post-WWII era — is proposed to deal with these
coming challenges.
Keywords Food security . Biofuel . Food prices .
Agricultural policy . Energy policy
Introduction
Food prices have major effects on food security. High
prices make food inaccessible for poor consumers. Low and
unstable prices hamper investment that should increase
employment and moderate the cost of food production in
poor countries. Since the late 19th century, international
agricultural prices have fluctuated downward. As a reac-
tion, many countries have stabilized and/or supported their
domestic agricultural prices. In most of them, rapid
agricultural development contributed to overall growth,
reducing poverty and food insecurity (Koning 2007; for
Asian Green Revolution countries, Dorward et al. 2004).
Conversely, poor countries that failed to stabilize and/or
support farm prices have seen their agriculture stagnate.
The plight of farmers was exacerbated by over-taxation and
dumping practices of countries that failed to combine farm
income supports with an adequate management of their
supply. Agricultural stagnation dragged the rest of the
economy with it, leaving large parts of the population poor
and vulnerable to fluctuations in food prices.
After several decades with very low prices, the year
2008 saw a sudden spike in global food prices. Although
prices have meanwhile come down again, this has rekindled
concerns that the long-term decline in food prices might
give way to increased scarcity. Population growth and an
increasing consumption of livestock products may double
the global demand for biomass for food up to mid-century.
Whether the global supply will keep pace with this is
uncertain (Koning et al. 2008; Rosegrant et al. 2006). One
important reason for this is the competition from agro-fuels
(crop-based biofuels). The production of these has strongly
increased since 2000. At first, this was seen as a possibility
to improve farm prices that had become too low to get
agriculture in poor countries moving. However, the role of
the agro-fuel boom in the 2008 price spike made clear that
agro-fuels might also exacerbate food price instability and
make food prices prohibitive for the poor (Banse et al.
2008a; Mitchell 2008; Rosegrant 2008).
To be sure, various strategies may moderate the risks that
the evolution of agro-food markets involves for global food
security. On the supply side, there are many possibilities for
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raising food production in developing countries (cf.
InterAcademy Council 2004; World Bank 2007). More
generally, there remains considerable room for increasing
the global supply of food through sustainable yield increases,
bio-refinement and new non-farm biomass production sys-
tems. On the demand side, an increase in food scarcity can be
countered by policies that mitigate the increase in consump-
tion. Most importantly, effective poverty reduction could
moderate the growth of world population and the ensuing
increase in demand. Poverty is the main factor that is holding
back the decline in demographic fertility in many low-income
countries. In addition, the growing consumption of livestock
products that involve especially unfavourable feed conversion
ratios, such as feedlot beef, could be mitigated. The
development of effective meat substitutes is a possibility, but
a shift to poultry or herbivore fish would also help (Koning et
al. 2008).
Also with respect to biofuels, various options are
available for protecting the food security of the poor.
Governments could stop supporting first-generation agro-
fuels, and channel the development of bio-based non-foods
towards feedstocks that minimally compete with food (e.g.
waste, algae). At the same time, small-scale techniques for
the decentralized pre-processing of biomass could be
developed to allow small farmers to benefit from the
growth in bio-based non-foods (Sanders et al. 2007).
However, key conditions for steering global food
security safely through the storms are timely investment
in global capacities for food production and stable
international agricultural prices. The latter should be high
enough to stimulate agricultural development in poor
countries but not so high as to prevent sufficient access to
food for poor consumers. In this respect, the rapid growth
of agro-fuels poses a major challenge. Through them, food
markets become closely related to energy markets, not just
nationally but globally. This paper analyses which institu-
tions are available, or missing but needed, for balancing
food and energy markets with a view to safeguarding the
food security of the world’s poor.
The outline of the paper is presented in Fig. 1. We start
with a more detailed discussion of the food security risks
that follow from price movements in agro-food markets,
paying special attention to effects of the emerging market
for biofuel (“Food security at risk”). Then we survey the
institutions for market regulation that currently exist in
three markets. First, we review how the regulation of
agricultural markets has evolved over time (“Regulation of
agricultural markets”). Second, we consider the regulation
of fossil fuel energy markets (“Regulation of fossil fuel
markets”). And third, we review current developments in
the regulation of the emerging markets for biofuels, which
connect both preceding domains (“Regulatory void in
biofuel markets”). “Conclusion: institutional requirements
for balancing agro-food and energy markets” concludes by
indicating institutional solutions for balancing these various
markets so as to safeguard global food security.
Food security at risk
Evolution of agricultural prices in the 20th century
Agricultural markets are prone to strong price instability. On
the one hand, the demand and the short-term supply are price-
inelastic. This implies that small surpluses cause steep price
falls, while small shortages send prices skyrocketing. On the
other hand, environmental and general-economic turbulence
makes fluctuations in supply and demand volumes unavoid-
able. These conditions together cause strong fluctuations in
prices. In addition, myopic expectations cause endogenous
price fluctuations (Ezekiel 1938; Nerlove 1958). Such
‘cobweb cycles’ are well-known in regional pig markets
(“pig cycle”). However, they also operate in wider agricul-
tural markets (Díaz Jerónimo, 2006; also cf. Boussard et al.
2006). By way of illustration, Fig. 2 shows the long-term
evolution of wheat prices in Britain and the US, as proxies
for world market prices. The historical evolution (see graphs
until 2007) shows strong fluctuations, which were caused by
the interaction of exogenous shocks (in particular, major
wars) and endogenous mechanisms.
Figure 2 also shows that decadal price fluctuations were
movements along a longer-term trend. Before the Industrial
Revolution, population growth sent the trend upwards.
Scarcity of fertilizer restricted the increase in yields, high
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transport costs made it costly to supplement local deficits
through imports, and under-developed knowledge infra-
structures slowed technical progress. Around 1875, these
Malthusian constraints were broken. New fertilizers, the
Transport Revolution, and scientific research removed the
shackles on supply, while fossil fuels freed vast areas of
land that had until then been used for non-food crops
(Schultz 1945). Since then, agricultural prices have fluctuated
along a downward trend. The latter did not just reflect a
normal cost price that decreased over time by productivity
growth. Agricultural markets rather leaned towards price-
depressing overproduction. This was because farmers
responded to low earnings by tightening their belts and
investing in new techniques that increased production
(Cochrane 1959). In a free market, therefore, supply and
demand were only balanced when low prices squeezed the
margins that farmers had for investment. It meant that
equilibrium was achieved through a slowdown of innovation
rather than through a reallocation of labor and capital
(Bairoch 1976; Koning 1994). A striking example was the
near-total stagnation of productivity growth in the agriculture
of Britain between 1875 and 1930, when this country kept to
agricultural free trade in spite of falling world market prices
(Koning 1994; Van Zanden 1991; Wade 1981).
New scarcity?
That food prices declined in the 20th century does not
guarantee that they will decline in the future. Since the late
1960s, neo-Malthusian authors have been warning for a
new impending food scarcity (Brown 1995; Ehrlich 1968;
Meadows et al. 1972). Economists in established research
institutions long contradicted these predictions (Bruinsma
2003; Mitchell et al. 1997; Rosegrant et al. 2001). Recently,
however, some of them have become more cautious in
assessing the global availability of food in the future (e.g.
Rosegrant et al. 2006).
Between now and mid-century, the world population will
increase from 6.5 billion to around 9 billion people. The
demand for animal products may double, not least as a result
of rising incomes in successful developing countries (Keyzer
et al. 2005; Steinfeld et al. 2006). As a consequence, the
global demand for biomass for food and feed may more than
double. This expected demand in growth is not as large as
that experienced in the second half of the 20th century, when
a rapid response of the global supply still caused interna-
tional agricultural prices to decrease. Therefore, the real
question is whether the global supply of food will once more
be able to keep up with the increase in demand.
This question can only be tentatively answered. On the
one hand, we know that the main sources of agricultural
growth in the 20th century are drying up. Only Africa and
Latin America have significant reserves of suitable land. In
several grain belts, freshwater supply for irrigation is
running dry (Molden 2007; Rosegrant et al. 2002). And
the increase in yield potentials of major food crops is
increasingly being restricted by plant metabolic efficiency
(cf. Hibberd et al. 2008; Yin and Struik 2007). On the other
hand, the technical room for raising the global output of
existing crop varieties is sufficient to provide an affluent
Fig. 2 Indexes of real wheat prices in the US and England & Wales,
1775–2007, and hypothetical evolution after 2007. (Prices up to 2005
are 5-year moving averages, with 1901-05=100. Prices in 2005-07 are
annual prices with the same base years. Sources: Mitchell 1975, 1990,
1993; USBC 1976; Eurostat various years; OECD 1990; USDA 2008;
USBL 2008.)
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diet to twice the world population that is expected by mid-
century— even if competing claims and unavoidable losses
are included in the analysis (Koning et al. 2008).
Innovations like C4 rice, algae, mariculture, biorefinement,
and attractive meat substitutes might further increase this
margin in the future.
However, the full realization of the potential that
technical scientists identify will be prevented by economic
constraints (ibid.):
& Producers are profit maximizers. So diminishing returns
make them stop short of achieving the maximum from
the techniques they are familiar with. For instance,
realizing the above mentioned technical potential for
crop production would require a sixfold increase in the
global irrigated area (ibid.). Diminishing returns to
irrigation investment will make the real increase a far
cry from this (many experts would be happy with 50%).
& Pushing back diminishing returns requires considerable
research investment to extend existing production
functions. However, such investment is constrained by
its profitability. In the 20th century, agricultural research
gave high returns (Alston et al. 2000), but this was due
to cheap fertilizer, and to the feasability, which is now
being depleted, for breeding plants that could transform
more fertilizer into harvested parts by improving plant
architecture, crop duration and the timing of crop
development. Whether research for realizing the
remaining potential for raising food production will
give comparable returns is highly uncertain.
& The progressive depletion of the world’s reserves of
fossil fuels and phosphate rock (Cordell 2008; Smil
2000) will raise the costs of many farm inputs,
especially fertilizers. Compensating for this by improv-
ing efficiency is difficult. The energy efficiency of
modern ammonia plants is approaching the chemical
maximum (Jenssen and Kongshaug 2003; Smil 2001).
An improvement of the efficiency of fertilizer-use will,
in its turn, be complicated by the need to raise
production on less suitable soils.
& In many developing countries, producers face less
favourable input-output price ratios than their counter-
parts in developed countries, as well as higher risks and
transaction costs. Therefore they may opt rationally for
simple technologies that give a lower output per
hectare, but which require fewer inputs for mainte-
nance. (See the schematic representation in Fig. 3,
which shows that with less favourable price ratios,
profit maximization may require techniques that allow a
lower maximum output.) As these countries contain a
large part of the world’s unused potential for farm
production (Penning de Vries et al. 1995), the con-
sequences for global food supply will be far-reaching.
Hence, as always in human history, global food supply
will reach an economic ceiling long before the technical
potential that may be perceived from the vantage point of
the world’s technological frontier has been exhausted.
Adequate policies can push the ceiling upward, but
surpassing it requires new breakthroughs that may be hard
to realize. Seen in this light, the technical potential for
feeding two or three times the expected world population
does not exclude a trend change in the coming decades. The
long-term decline in food prices might cease or give way to
a new long-term increase.
Influence of biofuels
These concerns are exacerbated by the recent biofuel boom.
Liquid biofuels were important in the Interbellum period
especially in the US, but had largely been replaced with
fossil fuels at the eve of WWII. They re-emerged strongly
in Brazil in the 1970s, but elsewhere only from the turn of
the millennium. Today, over 90% of liquid biofuels is
bioethanol, mainly produced in Brazil (from sugarcane) and
the US (from maize). Biodiesel is mainly produced in the
EU, from rapeseed, sunflower- and other oilseeds. Brazil,
the EU and the US together accounted for over 90% of
global biofuel production in 2006. The recent boom in first-
generation agro-fuels has several causes. One is “peak oil”:
environmentalists, major oil companies and academic
energy specialists are warning that the increasing scarcity
of fossil fuel makes it imperative to develop new energy
sources. The oil price rise between 2004 and mid-2008 has
q (output) 
x (input) 
q = /pq + (px/pq)x 
Traditional system 
Modern (high input) system
Fig. 3 Schematic representation of the selection of farm techniques in
favoured and less-favoured areas. The straight lines are price lines
with the ratio of input price (px) and output price (pq) as slope. Profit
(п) is maximized by selecting the point on production functions
through which the price line with the highest intercept with the output
axis can be drawn. For farmers in favoured areas (low ratios of input
prices to output prices) this point is located on the production function
of modern high input systems, but farmers in less-favoured areas will
select traditional systems
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given a further boost to biofuels — also because biofuels
can use the existing infrastructure for oil or gas products
(distribution and retailing systems, cars, combustion sys-
tems), which makes them more competitive than other
alternative energy sources. Besides, the discussion on CO2-
caused global warming has created a favourable situation
for the stimulation of alternative energy systems including
biofuels. Furthermore, the dependence of fossil fuel-
importing countries (especially the US and the EU) on
producing countries that are seen as unreliable (Russia, the
Middle East, Venezuela) generates pressures to lower this
dependency. Finally, problems of agricultural surpluses and
low farm incomes in many OECD countries have created a
fertile ground for searching for new outlets for agricultural
products.
There is widespread agreement that the rapid increase in
the production of biofuels in Brazil, the US and the EU was
one of the factors that contributed to the spike in food
prices in the first half of 2008 (Banse et al. 2008a; Mitchell
2008; Rosegrant 2008). It has been claimed that biofuels
have a stabilizing influence on agricultural markets by
introducing a floor and a ceiling effect (Schmidhuber
2007). However, the levels at which these effects occur
depend on energy prices. The latter are themselves highly
unstable, which affects the validity of the argument. Various
observers expect that biofuels will have an upward effect on
international food prices in the years to come (OECD-FAO
2008). Banse et al. (2008b) project that the proposed 10%
mandatory biofuel use in EU gasoline (draft EU directive
on promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources)
and biofuel initiatives of other countries will change a 13%
decrease in cereal prices between 2001 and 2020 into a 6%
increase, and a 7% decrease in oilseed prices into a 19%
increase. How the competition between foods and biobased
non-foods will evolve in the longer term is highly
unpredictable. Many people expect that biorefinement
(‘second-generation biofuels techniques’) will moderate
this competition because it will reduce the area require-
ments per unit of non-foods. However, these techniques
will also reduce the cost price of non-foods, which will
have the opposite effect (also cf. Meeusen and Van
Tongeren 2006; OECD 2006). Moreover, new increases in
energy prices will reinforce the competition between non-
foods and food.
Governance needs
Hence, we are confronted with two interrelated threats to
future food security: food price instability and potential
new scarcity of food. The development of crop-based
biofuels has strengthened these threats. The possibility for
the global supply of food to keep up with the growth in
demand may vitally depend on global institutions that (i)
ensure timely investment in the world’s capacity for
producing biomass, (ii) stabilize agricultural prices to
facilitate this investment and protect the poor against
sudden rises in food prices, and (iii) balance the use of
biomass for food and non-foods.
In the next sections, we review the evolution of
institutions for regulating the markets for agricultural
products, fossil fuels and biofuels. We discuss to what
extent these institutions may help to achieve the above
aims. We start with the regulation of agricultural
markets.
Regulation of agricultural markets
Market intervention and attempts at multilateral regulation
Since the regime change from scarcity to (over)abundance
in international agricultural markets in the 19th century,
ever more countries have intervened to stabilize and
support their domestic farm incomes. Most West European
countries started doing so in the late 19th century. All other
OECD countries followed in the 1930s (Koning 2008;
Tracy 1989). After the 1950s, many Asian developing
countries followed their example (Dawe 2001; Francks et
al. 1999; Kajisa and Akiyama 2005; Timmer 2002). These
policies mostly enabled a rapid agricultural development
that contributed to overall growth, reducing poverty and
food insecurity (Dorward et al. 2004; Koning 2007).
Conversely, poor countries that failed to stabilize and/or
support farm prices have seen their agriculture stagnate.
Agricultural stagnation dragged the rest of the economy
with it, leaving large parts of the population poor and
vulnerable to fluctuations in food prices (Koning and
Smaling 2005).
Without supply management, however, national poli-
cies for supporting or stabilizing agricultural prices
distorted world markets by causing import substitution
and dumping. In the 1930s–1940s, therefore, the League
of Nations, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the FAO,
John Maynard Keynes and others advocated a multilat-
eral regulation of international markets through price
bands, buffer stocks, and in some cases production and
export controls (Chimni 1987; Henningson 1981; Keynes
1943). It led to the first attempts at international commodity
agreements for major crops. In a similar vein, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) envisaged the
regulation of agricultural markets through managed trade
rather than free trade. It allowed countries to conclude
commodity agreements to stabilize world markets (article
XX) and to support their own agriculture provided that they
controlled their domestic production and exports (articles
XI and XVI).
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Mercantilism and pseudo-liberalization
In the decades that followed, however, the US and the EU
thwarted this pursuit of a multilateral regulation. While
blocking supportive control agreements for tropical export
crops (Chimni 1987; Maizels 1992), they protected their
own farmers without respecting the GATT conditions that
bound such support to production and export controls. As a
consequence, both blocs were dumping increasing volumes
on the world market. In the 1980s, the mutual dumping of
grain and grain substitutes caused a trade conflict between
the two powers. This dominated the agricultural negotia-
tions during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
After 6 years of stalemate, bilateral negotiations between
the US and the EU led to a compromise (Blair House
Agreement), which was enshrined in the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture. It prescribed countries to reduce their price
supports for agricultural commodities. At the same time,
however, it exempted certain forms of direct payments, also
from the original GATT obligation to couple supports to
supply management (Koning 2008). Since then, both the
US and the EU have been shifting from price support to
direct payments to farmers, allowing them to continue
exporting farm products for prices below their costs of
production (Ritchie et al. 2003). The extent of this
‘dumping in disguise’ was widened by the abandoning of
remaining production controls: the set aside programme in
the US in 1996 (Ray et al. 2003), and the phasing out of the
milk quotas in the EU as is happening today.
Although mercantilist interests played a prominent role in
this policy change, it was accompanied by a discourse on
“trade liberalization”. This reflected a more general para-
digm shift in economics and economic policies. The growth
disturbances of the 1970s had discredited the “neoclassical-
Keynesian synthesis” that had dominated the economics
discipline in the first postwar decades, and that had
advocated active government intervention for achieving
socio-economic aims like social security and full employ-
ment. It catalysed a “microeconomic revolution” that
reduced the role of government once again to the classical
night watchman state. In agricultural economics, this
revolution entailed the abandoning of an older institutionalist
approach that had highlighted the rationale for government
support (Gardner 1992). According to the new consensus,
such support was unnecessary and could only hamper
economic growth and hurt poor consumers. Studies based
on computable general equilibrium models claimed that
multilateral trade liberalization would benefit developing
countries (e.g. Anderson and Martin 2005; Anderson et al.
2006). Trade liberalization was also expected to reduce
price instability as it would allow harvest failures and
bumper harvests in different places to cancel each other out
(e.g. Bale and Lutz 1979). Besides, the idea was that private
stock holding could take over the stabilizing function of
public stocks. Accordingly, the World Bank and the IMF
pressured many developing countries to abandon public
stock holdings. Also, it was thought that futures markets
could reduce price risks for smallholders in developing
countries. The World Bank experimented with devices to
allow smallholders to participate in these markets as an
alternative for international commodity agreements which it
deemed economically unviable. Last but not least, it was
thought that private investment could take over the role of
public investment in agricultural research. Part of the WTO
agenda was the strengthening of intellectual property rights
to stimulate private research investment.
Mercantilist interests seized upon the new economic
orthodoxy, adopting a liberal-economic discourse to justify
the shift to direct payments. The result was an uneasy
marriage. More principled free-market economists were
disappointed with actual reforms in developed countries.
Nevertheless, their theories allowed these reforms to be
justified as an intermediate step towards real liberalization,
rather than to be denounced as a pseudo-liberal continua-
tion of offensive protection.
Short-term- and long-term effects
In the short term, the policy reforms have made agricultural
markets more prone to price fluctuations. External influen-
ces that cause changes in supply and demand do not always
cancel each other out. Environmental disturbances like El
Niño may have a global effect, and the same holds for
global economic booms or recessions. Moreover, liberal-
ization strengthens the effect of myopic expectations on
prices. The major part of farm production is traded in
domestic markets, where decreased price stabilization has
increased the scope for cobweb cycling. Some agricultural
economists (like Boussard’s group in France; Boussard et
al. 2006) predicted this effect, but their warnings went
unheeded by policy makers and their mainstream col-
leagues. The running down of public stocks in the US and
the EU as part of their policy reforms also reinforced price
instability. Private stock holding does not compensate for
this because it is less anti-cyclical. As has now become
clear, rising prices may induce entrepreneurs to retain
stocks in the expectation of further price increases, so that
price rises are reinforced rather than moderated. Something
similar holds for futures markets, which can only reduce
price risks for producers if futures prices are not too far
removed from spot market prices (Banse et al. 2008a). The
speculation in these markets has become such that the two
prices diverge and the underlying price instability is
increased. Besides, experiments with arrangements to allow
smallholder farmers in developing countries to participate
in these markets have met with poor results.
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The opening of OECD markets may benefit larger
farmers in agricultural exporting and middle-income
countries like Australia or Brazil. However, it is question-
able whether agricultural trade liberalization would stimu-
late the development in poor countries. Many poor
countries themselves need protection to get their agriculture
moving (Koning 2002; Koning and Smaling 2005).
Besides, reduction in price support in OECD countries
erodes the value of arrangements that give many poor
countries preferential access to OECD markets (Panagariya
2005; Yu 2007).
In the longer term, “liberal” reform might precipitate a
reversal in the secular trend in food prices. Increased price
instability discourages timely investment in research,
human capital and infrastructure. Direct payments stimulate
the increase in agricultural production capacities less than
price supports do. Additionally, they involve higher budget
costs, strengthening pressures for reducing the level of farm
income support. The cuts in public investment in agricul-
tural research have similar effects. From 1976–1981 to
1991–2000, the growth of this investment fell from 4.5% to
1.6% yearly (Pardey and Beintema 2001; Pardey et al.
2006). This has not been compensated by private invest-
ment, whose growth rate also declined after the 1980s.1
Moreover, private research investment is one-sidedly
focused on objectives like pesticide tolerance. Objectives
like drought tolerance — important for raising production
in many less-favoured areas — are being neglected (Pingali
2007).
The reduction in price stabilization also increases the
risk that price fluctuations will interact with a change in the
long-term trend in a way that may cause unnecessarily high
rises in food prices. For example, it is widely assumed that
the low prices and cuts on research expenditures in the
1980s–1990s have reduced investments in agriculture and
that this has contributed to the recent price rise. Suppose
that when the global recession is over, prices will rise again,
as many observers expect. And suppose that this will
prompt a rapid exploitation of the last margins for cheap
increases in the global farm output that still exist in
countries such as Brazil and Russia. After some years, this
may induce a new price fall, which may once more squeeze
longer-term investment in the world’s carrying capacity for
food production. If this were to coincide with a change in
the long-term trend, the result might well be a period with
stronger price rises than have taken place in the last few
years. The undershooting of the outgoing trend investment
would then involve a larger undershooting of the new trend,
which would prompt a correspondingly large increase in
prices above this trend (see right-hand part of Fig. 2). In
this admittedly worst case scenario, a tripling or quadru-
pling of grain prices cannot be excluded. Such a price rise
would hardly affect food security in rich countries.
However, it would wreak havoc in poor countries, and the
effects would certainly be felt in other regions too.
Regulation of fossil fuel markets
By the growing use of biomass for energy production, agro-
food markets are increasingly related to energy markets.
Energy prices and their fluctuation are thus more directly
affecting food prices. Hence, the governance of agro-food
markets can no longer be isolated from that of energy
markets. What institutions for regulating energy markets
have evolved, and how successful are they in stabilizing
energy prices?
Compared to agricultural commodities, energy commod-
ities (i.e. oil and gas mainly) are much more subject to
exchange on a world market, especially because production
is limited to only a few countries. Oil was the first fossil
energy source that was widely traded. Fluctuations in oil
prices are politically sensitive in current energy-dependent
societies, not unlike fluctuations in food prices. Some oil
market speculation is directly related to the political
stability of certain states. Concerns about this stability have
from time to time driven up the price of oil. The oil market
is exceptional in being so sensitive to the politics of volatile
regions. Even the supply of natural gas is in general more
secure, as it is not traded across oceans by tankers as
extensively. Regionally, though, the production and piped
transport of gas can also be tied up with political instability
(Correljé and van der Linde 2006). Compared to agro-food
production, however, the production and prices of fossil
energy are only incidentally affected by environmental
disturbances (such as hurricane Katrina).
As energy has increasingly become a crucial commod-
ity for modern societies, most countries have installed
national policies for securing energy supply and control-
ling prices, and many energy production and distribution
companies have been publicly owned and managed. In
resource-rich countries, domestic energy prices are kept
artificially low for political and economic reasons, while
export prices are set at a different level through taxes
(dual pricing), amongst other things. Traditionally, energy-
importing states have installed stocks to balance shortfalls
in oil delivery, but less so for gas. Like public food stocks
(see previous section), these stocks have diminished in
recent years, making oil price fluctuations more immediate
and stronger.
The “supermajors” (first the Seven Sisters, now the six
largest multinational oil companies) have had an impact on
international energy prices for quite some time. But with1 Oral communication Nienke Beintema.
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the establishment of the OPEC2 in 1960 and especially
since the OPEC’s political activism in the 1970s, the power
of multinational oil companies to influence prices has
decreased significantly. The large multinational companies
currently control just 5% of world oil and gas reserves.
OPEC states and OPEC state-owned companies control
50% of oil trade and produce about 40% of world oil
(though only 16% of world natural gas).3 It is likely that the
multinational companies will continue to lose power to
state-owned and state-controlled companies (increasingly of
non-OECD countries). In contrast to agro-food trade, rather
than import barriers, export barriers (restrictions and taxes,
sometimes differentiated to different markets) and dual
(domestic and export) prices of energy exporting countries
are debated in energy trade liberalization.
For a long time, fluctuations in international oil prices
remained limited (cf. Fig. 4). However, between the early
1970s and the mid 1980s, and again since the late 1990s,
oil prices have fluctuated widely. In the 1970s, OPEC
policies and political instability of oil-exporting countries
(e.g. Iran) were mainly responsible for limiting production
and raising prices. However, recent price rises are attributed
to several drivers: lack of stocks/reserves, political instabil-
ity in oil-producing regions, lack of buffer production
capacity due to poor investments, demand increases in
emerging economies, and ‘peak oil’ (Wirl 2008). These
factors are thought to explain why price rises are not always
and immediately followed by offsetting increases in the
supply (Correljé and van der Linde 2006). However, energy
prices also react strongly to global economic developments,
which may thereby exacerbate price spikes and price falls.
World energy trade is not subject to a public multilateral
regulation comparable to the WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture. The WTO has no energy chapter and no energy rules,
and for a long time, energy was considered as a special
commodity that did not fall under a WTO regime. Since the
1970s, oil- and gas-importing countries have been demand-
ing WTO regulation (focused on further liberalization of
energy markets), in order to make their access to energy
less vulnerable to political developments. While many no
longer consider energy ill-suited for WTO regulation,
attempts to bring it under WTO ruling have had little
success so far. The first reason is that about 50% of the
energy products that are traded globally comes from non-
WTO members. Secondly, in WTO accession processes,
future members often aim to prevent — or demand to be
excluded from — energy service sector liberalization,
unbundling of energy monopolies, elimination of export
taxes, and termination of dual prices. Thirdly, the world
market, in the sense of a coordinating institution, has partly
been replaced by bilateral or regional contracts by countries
that thus try to secure their energy supply and stabilize their
energy prices (e.g. gas contracts in Europe) (Selivanova
2007).
Following the instability in oil prices over the last
decades, we see several calls for an international UN
organization to bring order into the world oil (and to a
lesser extent gas) market (cf. Glenn and Gordon 2002;
Kirton 2003). Such a UN organization should organize
long-term contracts that provide security of supply related
to security of demand. These calls move beyond the old
plea for liberalization from oil-importing countries and
unilateral attempts at influencing oil prices by exporting
countries. They are underpinned by environmental argu-
ments (related to international climate policy) and by
arguments linked to energy source diversification (the
need to shift to renewables). Nevertheless, the contours
of an international energy organization have yet to be
seen.
Regulatory void in biofuel markets
Crop-based biofuels (agro-fuels) link agricultural markets
and energy markets. Through them, movements in energy
prices can influence food prices. Policies that stimulate or
discourage agro-fuels have effects in both markets. In this
section, we discuss the evolution of agro-fuel markets and
consider how they are regulated.
Liquid biofuels have re-emerged from the turn of the
millennium. (Only in Brazil, bioethanol was already widely
produced in the 1970s.) During the first years of the new
millennium, biofuels have been produced primarily for
domestic markets, with hardly any cross-border trade.
Governments in many countries have been stimulating
these national markets in numerous ways. These include
large R&D programmes; mandatory targets for biofuel use
in gasoline and diesel; the subsidization through tax
reductions and credit facilities of farmers, biofuel pro-
ducers, and various demand-side actors; experiments with
transport technologies and programmes; and so on and so
2 The OPEC is still the most powerful multilateral institution
(basically a public cartel) that aims to control market prices of oil by
regulating production, basically for the benefit of its 13 member states
(Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela).
3 In late 2008, 15 major gas-producing and —exporting countries
cooperating in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, with headquarters
located in Doha, Qatar, adopted a chapter to secure high gas prices.
This is believed to have become an OPEC-like natural gas cartel.
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forth (Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007; Mol 2007). The
prices of biofuels were strongly influenced by these
policies. At the same time, protective measures against
foreign competition prevented serious international trade in
biofuels for several years. Because biofuel markets resem-
bled fossil energy markets to some extent, and because one
of the reasons for biofuel development was energy security,
an interest of governments in price setting, protection and
market development was to be expected. Yet there are two
major differences from oil. Firstly, while oil is produced in
a limited number of countries/regions, biofuels — or
feedstock for biofuels — can be produced in many more
countries. Secondly, for current biofuel feedstock produc-
tion, fertile land (with inputs and water) is a prerequisite,
which leads to competition with food.
Recently, international trade in (feedstock for) biofuels
has been increasing. Besides energy companies and state
agencies, farmer cooperatives, agribusiness and car compa-
nies have become involved in this trade. Estimates are that
around 10% of the global biofuel production was traded
cross-border in 2006. In addition, palm oil, soy and other
feedstock for especially the production of biodiesel is
traded internationally.4 While we cannot yet speak of a
globalized biofuel economy, and protectionism continues
to exist, it is clear in which direction the development is
going. The mandatory targets of liquid biofuel use in
OECD countries are driving increasing international
trade, as many countries cannot meet their domestic
demand. Increasingly, developing countries are moving
into energy crop production. But their lack of hard and
soft infrastructures might limit them to exporting feed-
stock, so that they would not fully benefit from their
comparative advantage in biomass production by becom-
ing exporters of (higher valued) biofuels (Mol 2007).
Foreign direct investment could prevent this. Indeed, US,
Brazilian and European businesses see major commercial
opportunities in developing countries. They are seizing
these opportunities by supplying advanced equipment,
setting up production and processing facilities, and invest-
ing in energy plantations in biomass-rich regions such as
sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. However, the
positive or negative consequences for local economies are
not yet clear.
The emergence of a global market for biofuels has
induced attempts at global collaboration on standards and
specifications related to biofuel quality. In addition, it has
led to a demand for ending protection and for multilateral
liberalization. There are some developments in this direc-
tion and one can expect the WTO to try to become the
leading framework for global biofuel regulation, in close
relation to its agricultural chapter (Howse et al. 2006;
Motaal 2008). According to some, the biofuels issue could
even help to overcome the existing deadlock in the
agricultural trade negotiations in the WTO. It could help
to legitimize the existence of the WTO, which is going
through a difficult time now that bilateral trade agreements
are partly replacing WTO agreements. However, how
biofuels will fit into the existing WTO trade regime is not
at all clear. Are they going to be defined as agricultural,
industrial, or energy goods? This has consequences for the
subsidies allowed and the kind of import tariffs they can be
subject to (Motaal 2008). Governments of biofuel-
producing countries are increasingly convinced that import
barriers need to be broken down, but they seem less willing
to lift subsidies to their domestic primary producers,
processors, and users. And what would be the consequen-
ces of a WTO-conform trade regime for domestic regu-
lations and standards (e.g. mandatory use of biofuels, fuel
content requirements, environmental conditionalities)
(Dufey 2006; Loppacher 2005)? Up till now these ques-
tions have not been clarified.
4 This enabled Rotterdam to become a European hub in biofuel
processing, although there is no abundance of cropland in the
neighbourhood.
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Fig. 4 Average annual price of crude oil, 1991–2008 (data source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/)
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At the moment, the EU is arguably the most active
regional government institution that develops biofuel
policies which, though primarily meant for its internal
market and member states, have significant consequences
for international markets. The emphasis in EU biofuel
policies (e.g. the 2008 draft renewable energy directive) is
very much on stimulating biofuels, a little on the environ-
mental side effects of biofuels, but not at all on the relation
between biofuels and food prices.
Meanwhile, globally traded biofuels are also becoming
subject to private forms of governance. Standard-setting
agencies such as the International Standard Organization
are focusing on biofuels. Multinationals are developing
corporate policies and coordinating international commod-
ity chains and networks. We are also witnessing a
blossoming of round tables, private labelling initiatives,
and international networks and arrangements in which a
variety of economic and civil society actors are working
together, often assisted by governments, to facilitate trade
and investment (Verdonk et al. 2007; van den Hombergh
2008; Mol 2009). These emerging private governance
arrangements to some extent address environmental side
effects of large-scale biofuel production. Further coordina-
tion of the mushrooming private, public-private and public
(inter)national initiatives (of individual companies, NGOs,
multi-sector coalitions, nation-states etc.) could certainly
help to mitigate such side effects and even to tackle some of
the social issues in biofuel production. However, how these
initiatives could address the influence of biofuels on
international food prices remains entirely unclear.
In conclusion, a global market for biofuels is emerging,
and it is strongly linked to both energy and agro-food
markets. This biofuels market is still subject to significant
national stimulation and regulation through mandatory
market creation, subsidies, import tariffs, and the like. But
the tendency is towards cautious liberalization — perhaps
in a WTO framework. Neither the national policies nor this
incipient liberalization are addressing the international
competition between biofuels and food staples and its
consequences for global food security.
Conclusion: institutional requirements for balancing
agro-food and energy markets
What conclusions can be drawn from this review of the
regulation of agro-food, energy and biofuel markets with a
view to food security? Global food security is best served
by stable agricultural prices. These prices should neither be
so high as to inhibit access to food by the world’s poor in
the short term, nor so low as to inhibit timely investment in
the world’s carrying capacity for biomass production in the
longer term. Because agro-food and energy systems are
becoming increasingly inter-related, stabilizing agro-food
prices within adequate price bands cannot be done without
stabilizing energy prices. Our analysis suggests that current
global institutions are ill-designed for balancing agro-food
and energy markets, and thus for securing food security.
Keeping the world market prices of major crops within
desirable price bands requires arrangements that adjust the
production of biobased non-foods to the situation of food
markets. Private standards and certification schemes for
biobased non-foods are not up to this task. No matter how
important such arrangements may be for improving the
environmental sustainability and the social impacts of
biobased non-foods in the areas where they are produced,
they are little suited for regulating the competition between
fuel and food at the global level.
The WTO framework is likewise ill suited for this
purpose, at least as long as the WTO agenda is guided by
the objective of trade liberalization. As we have argued
above, trade liberalization does not redress important causes
of price instability in agricultural markets. Neither will
market deregulation help to keep the average prices of
major farm staples at desirable levels. To keep the world
market prices of major food staples within desirable price
bands, rather than mere trade liberalization, one would need
a multilateral system based on managed trade. In it, public
buffer stocks could be used for stabilizing world market
prices (also cf. von Braun and Torero 2008). Tax or other
restrictions could be imposed on biobased non-foods —
especially those derived from crops — when the world
market prices of major food staples exceed a ceiling.
Maximum export quotas and minimum import quotas could
be imposed on high- and middle-income countries to
defend a price floor. These quotas could be made saleable
between countries to allow adjustment to shifts in compar-
ative advantage.
Because of the increasing competition between foods and
biobased non-foods, such arrangements cannot easily be
introduced on a commodity-by-commodity basis, as with the
older international commodity agreements. The same con-
sideration also pleads against the idea of leaving the
regulation of biofuel markets to a sectoral UN International
Energy Organization or a UN World Environmental/Sus-
tainability Organization. Rather what is needed, in our view,
is a coherent system for coordinated supply management in
several markets. This was the objective of UNCTAD’s
Integrated Program for Commodities in the 1970s, and of
the Commodity Control Organization that Keynes proposed
in his 1943 blueprint for the post-war economic order
(Keynes 1943; Maizels 1992). The marriage of mercantil-
ism and economic orthodoxy that inspired the liberalizing
agenda for agricultural trade in the 1980s has got these
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ideas into the bad books of the international political
community. Nevertheless, the coming competition between
food, feed and fuel, and the warning that has been given by
the 2008 price spike, may be reasons for reconsidering the
issue. The current ambivalence towards under-regulated
markets that has followed the financial crisis also creates a
more favourable climate for such a reflection.
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